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IN THE COURT OF COMMON ~LEAS 
CUYAH<DGA.80u'NT'(, Q~IO 
( : !. i \~, ,I - f.~:: / J j .~ ·r \j 
ALAN J. DAVIS, Special Administrator ) 
of the Estate of SAMUEL H. ) 
SHEPPARD ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
STATE OF OHIO ) 
) 
Defendant ) 
CASE NO. 96-312322-CV 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
OR ALTERNATIVELY TO DENY 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Now comes the Plaintiff, through counsel, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant 
to Rule 12(F) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, to strike Defendant's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the alternative, to deny said Motion for the reason that 
the arguments contained in said Motion have been previously briefed and presented to 
this Court and rejected, are clearly redundant and have no merit. The State of Ohio, while 
unhappy with this Court's prior rulings on the very same arguments, is simply not content 
to avail itself of an appropriate appellate remedy to challenge this Court's rulings, but 
~- ·-·---........., C_ arrogantly Jeels'i it has the privilege to continue to repeatedly raise the same exact 
arguments, albeit with different headings, and thereby abuse the administration of justice 
and the Rules of Civil Procedure by causing more unnecessary delays and costs with 
respect to this case, as more fully briefed in the attached Brief hereto. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Motion to Strike or Alternatively to Deny 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings has been t+a14~aeldrf&'ered, this ::< 7 
day of __ P?_~---r---' 1997, to Patrick Murphy, Esq. and Marilyn Cassidy, Esq., 
Assistant Cuyahoga County Prosecutors, at their office, Justice Center, 1200 Ontario 
Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
TER~i-V~ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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BRIEF 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is the latest installation of the 
State's effort to prevent the matter of Dr. Sam Sheppard's wrongful imprisonment claim 
from being heard on the merits. Two previous Motions to Dismiss, raising the same 
arguments, were rejected on January 13, 1997. These previous Motions, and responses 
thereto, were extensively researched, briefed, and considered, and the case clearly was 
headed for a trial. Indeed, the Court met with undersigned counsel and First Assistant 
Prosecutor Carmen Marino (thought to represent the State of Ohio) on March 10, 1997. 
A timetable for resolving evidentiary issues was agreed upon and the Court scheduled 
a hearing for May 9, 1997 in order to focus on outstanding evidence questions. By 
agreement of the parties, the trial on the merits was scheduled for July 14, 1997. Nothing 
was mentioned about any further attempts to block a trial in this case, as that question 
had been moot for some time. 
Then, without regard to any of the ground rules mutually previously agreed to by 
the Court and counsel, the State, represented by other members of the Prosecutor's 
Office (without Mr. Marino on the pleadings) filed its Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings one day before the May 9th hearing. They also conveniently failed to notify 
or serve a copy of their eleventh hour Motion on counsel for the Plaintiff. The Court was 
gracious in allowing its copy to be reviewed as Plaintiffs counsel walked into the 
courtroom for the hearing. As a result of this desperate attempt to re-assert previously 
rejected arguments, the original purpose of the scheduled hearing was sabotaged and 
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then indefinitely delayed because the Court was placed in a position of having to consider 
the Motion, and afford an opportunity to Plaintiff to respond. 
Such tactics cannot be tolerated by the Court. A litigant must not be permitted to 
continue to file the same Motions and raise the same arguments after unequivocal 
adverse rulings. This Court has the discretion, pursuant to Rule 12(F) to strike "from any 
pleading any insufficient claim or defense or any redundant (emphasis added), 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The State's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings is clearly redundant. 
In the August, 1996 Motion to Dismiss (overruled on January 13, 1997), the State 
raised !aches, statute of limitations, standing, abatement, and only live individuals 
can sue. In the May, 1997, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, the State raised 
laches, statute of limitations, standing, abatement, and only live individuals can 
sue. No new law, facts or grounds were stated, other than the concept of jurisdiction was 
thrown in. However, the jurisdiction argument was based upon the recycling of the original 
standing argument - in other words, that an estate has no authority to bring an action in 
wrongful imprisonment. The two Motions are identical almost to the word, and the State 
makes no serious attempt to camouflage the use of a word processor to spit out the same 
brief. 
The appropriate response of this Court is to strike the pleading. The State's 
attitude is essentially - "we don't like your ruling, so we'll file again and again until you get 
the point." This mentality is dangerous and disrespectful to the Court, and must not be 
tolerated. And then when one considers that the Motion was filed to thwart the Court's 
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agenda for May 9, 1997, one begins to wonder if the State Ohio is dealing with a full 
deck. 
To the extent that a response is necessary, Plaintiff would incorporate all 
arguments previously raised in its earlier responses. However, since the issues were 
previously briefed, Plaintiff has discovered a case where both the Common Pleas Court 
and the Court of Claims recognized that a wrongful imprisonment claim survives the death 
of the individual and can be brought by the estate. In Eva Celestino, Administrator of the 
Estate of Juan A. Celestino v. State of Ohio, (Court of Common Pleas, Sandusky County 
No. 94CV13; Court of Claims No. 95-127'70), the issue of abatement was raised in a 
Motion to Dismiss and rejected. The State failed to perfect an appeal and an action 
pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §2743.48 was filed on behalf of the estate in the Court 
of Claims. The Ohio Attorney General eventually stipulated to a judgment. See attached 
records from this case. 
The central argument of the State is that the wrongful imprisonment remedy is only 
available to live people, and is extinguished once the victim of a wrongful imprisonment 
dies. Apparently, even the Attorney General's Office has given up on that argument and 
had no problem consenting to the payment of damages to the Estate of Juan A. 
Celestino. It is paramount under Ohio jurisprudence that, except for very narrowly defined 
actions specified in the survivor statute, Ohio Revised Code §2305.21, actions, whether 
by statutory remedy, or common law, survive. The State is hung up on the word 
"individual" and therefore assumes, simplistically and without any legal authority, that it 
means the action does not survive. But the analysis does not end with the dictionary 
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definition of "person" or "individual"; it must be viewed in the context of the long tradition 
in Ohio in favor of remedies surviving the death of the victim, unless the legislature 
specifically identifies an action that does not survive. And to be sure, the legislature has 
not removed the wrongful imprisonment remedy from those actions that survive, and it 
is presumptuous for the State to attempt to second guess the legislative intent in this 
area. 
The remaining arguments advanced by the State such as !aches and statute of 
limitations are completely devoid of merit, as the statutory scheme for the wrongful 
imprisonment remedy specifically sets forth the applicable time limits - two years to file 
in the Court of Claims after a Common Pleas Court's determination of wrongful 
imprisonment. There is no time limitation as to when a party may seek such 
determination. These issues were briefed in Plaintiffs previous Brief in Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto. 
For all the above reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
should be stricken and/or denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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